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Abstract 
Previous research in the happy victimizer tradition indicated that preschool and early 
elementary-school children attribute positive emotions to the violator of a moral norm, 
whereas older children attribute negative moral emotions. Cognitive and motivational 
processes have been suggested as underlying this developmental shift. The current research 
investigated whether making the happy victimizer task less cognitively demanding, by 
providing children with alternative response formats, would increase children’s attribution of 
moral emotions and moral motivation. In Study 1, 93 4- to 7-year-old British children 
responded to the happy victimizer questions either in a normal condition (where they 
spontaneously pointed with a finger), a wait condition (where they had to wait before giving 
their answers), or an arrow condition (where they had to point with a paper arrow). In Study 
2, 40 Spanish 4-year-old children responded in the happy victimizer task either in a normal or 
a wait condition. In both studies, participants’ attribution of moral emotions and moral 
motivation was significantly higher in the conditions with alternative response formats (wait, 
arrow) than in the normal condition. The role of cognitive abilities for emotion attribution in 
the happy victimizer task is discussed. 
 
Keywords: moral emotions; happy victimizer task; response format; cognitive development  
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 The question whether cognition or emotions underlie human moral functioning has 
been debated for centuries in moral philosophy (Hume, 1751/1957; Kant, 1781/1965), and 
more recently, in moral psychology (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Huebner, Dwyer & Hauser, 2008). 
Most contemporary psychological theories of morality acknowledge that emotions play an 
important role in moral decision-making and behaviour (e.g., Cushman, 2013; Eisenberg, 
2000; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). For example, anticipating the 
negative feelings accompanying a norm violation (e.g., guilt, regret, sadness on the part of the 
violator; sadness and anger on the part of the victim) or the positive feelings resulting from 
moral acts (e.g., pride on the part of the agent, happiness on the part of the recipient) can 
serve as motivation to act in accordance with moral norms (Hoffman, 2000; Krettenauer, Jia, 
& Mosleh, 2011; Nichols, 2002). The experience and anticipation of such moral emotions 
have been regarded as indicators of the internalization of, commitment to, and compliance to 
moral norms, even in situations in which a moral action contradicts selfish desires or in which 
a norm violation would not involve external sanctions (Gintis, 2000; Keller, 2004).  
A host of studies have investigated the development of moral emotions and their 
relationship to (im-)moral behaviors and judgments across childhood and adolescence (see 
Arsenio, 2014; Malti & Ongley, 2014 for recent overviews). One interesting paradigm used 
in the literature is the happy victimizer task, which investigates children’s attribution of 
(moral) emotions to violators of moral norms. Such moral emotion attributions have been 
regarded as an important indicator of children’s moral motivation (Nunner-Winkler, 2007). 
Indeed, previous research has emphasized the importance of understanding (moral) emotions 
for children’s moral behavior (e.g., Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, 
Parsons, & Hummel, 2010; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013). The current research focused on 
cognitive factors that might help explain when and why children attribute negative emotions 
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to moral norm violators. Specifically, we assessed whether changing the way participants 
responded in the happy victimizer task affected the attribution of appropriate moral emotions 
to victimizers and children’s moral motivation. Previous research on preschool children’s 
cognitive development has indicated that asking them to wait before giving an answer or to 
respond to a task in a non-standard way (e.g. pointing with an arrow instead of one’s finger) 
helps children overcome some of the cognitive demands of deception, executive-function, or 
counterfactual-reasoning tasks and leads to more correct responses (Beck, Carroll, Brunsdon, 
& Gryg, 2011; Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Diamond, Kirkham, & Amso, 2002; Hala & 
Russell, 2001). Such alternative response formats might assist children with not following a 
dominant, but incorrect, response and help them to work out the correct answer. In two 
studies, we investigated whether children who responded with a delay or who used alternative 
response formats would show higher moral emotion attribution and moral motivation in the 
happy victimizer task compared to children who used the standard response format employed 
in previous happy victimizer research. 
The Happy Victimizer phenomenon 
Imagine the following scenario (e.g., Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988): A group of 
children are playing in the playground. One child is on the swing, and her classmate also 
wants to use the swing. The classmate pushes the child off the swing, and the child falls to the 
ground. Is it right what the classmate did? And how does the classmate feel? Such scenarios 
and questions are commonly used in the happy victimizer paradigm. Empirical research in 
this paradigm has found that from the late elementary-school years onwards the majority of 
older children, adolescents, and adults regard actions, such as pushing another person off the 
swing, as morally wrong and attribute negative emotions to the victim of the violation (see 
Arsenio, 2014; Krettenauer, Malti, & Sokol, 2008, for reviews). Yet, while most adults 
believe that the victimizer (i.e., the classmate) feels bad, guilty, or ashamed about his or her 
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moral violation, preschool and early elementary-school children attribute positive emotions to 
the victimizer, especially when the victimizer benefits from the transgression (e.g., by using 
the swing him-/herself; Arsenio, 2014; Krettenauer et al., 2008). Furthermore, neither the 
severity of the transgression’s consequences for the victim, the tangibility of the profit 
gained, nor the kind of relationship between violator and victim affected young children’s 
attribution of positive emotions to the victimizer (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Nunner-Winkler 
& Sodian, 1988). Thus, the happy victimizer phenomenon appears to be rather robust in 
young children and points to a gap in their moral cognitions and moral emotion attribution. 
Whereas young children comprehend that certain actions are morally wrong because they 
have negative effects on others’ welfare and rights (Turiel, 1983), this knowledge is not 
translated into their attribution of emotions to the victimizer. 
Research has shown a marked decrease in the attribution of positive emotions to the 
victimizer over the course of middle childhood (Arsenio, 2014). From around the age of 7, 
the majority of children attribute mixed or negative feelings to the victimizer ( Keller, 
Lourenço, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003; Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 
1988). A number of accounts have emerged with the aim to explain these age differences in 
emotion attributions to the violator. Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988; Nunner-Winkler, 
2007) focused on the role of moral motivation in moral emotion attribution: Young children 
focus in their emotion attribution on the match between a victimizer’s desires and the 
outcome of the action. Accordingly, young children believe that victimizers will feel happy, 
if they get what they want. Conversely, older children display a moral orientation; their 
emotion attributions to the victimizer are influenced by moral standards and the victim’s pain. 
Arsenio and colleagues (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Arsenio & Lover, 1995) proposed that 
children’s increasing ability to coordinate emotions underlies the shift from positive to 
negative emotion attribution to victimizers. Young children regard the emotions of victims 
Moral Emotion Attribution and Response Format      6 
 
 
and victimizers as two independent affective reactions to the same event, whereas older 
children comprehend the victimizer’s emotional conflict (i.e., happiness over satisfied desires 
versus sadness over the victim’s situation) and attribute mixed or negative emotions. Sokol 
and colleagues (Krettenauer et al., 2008; Sokol, 2004; Sokol, Chandler, & Jones, 2004) 
suggested that children’s emotion attribution in the happy victimizer task is affected by their 
changing views of human agency. According to this view, young children subscribe to a 
mechanical or “copy-theory” of human agency, in which human action is largely seen as a 
result of passively reacting to the demands of the external environment. While young children 
would acknowledge that a violator’s transgression is motivated by his/her selfish desires, they 
do not appreciate that the violator has a choice to act on that desire or not. Older children, 
however, develop an interpretive theory of human agency, according to which humans are 
active and autonomous agents whose actions are based on a deliberate choice. Therefore, 
older children comprehend that a violator chose to engage in a transgression and is therefore 
morally responsible for it.  
Only a few studies have assessed whether and how cognitive abilities may affect 
children’s emotion attributions in the happy victimizer task. This is surprising, because 
attributing (moral) emotions in the happy victimizer task has a strong cognitive component: 
participants need to have a basic understanding of the conflict represented in the task (i.e., the 
conflict between fulfilling selfish desires vs. upholding a moral norm), the action choices 
available to the victimizer, as well as the consequences of these actions (Malti & Ongley, 
2014). So far, two types of cognitive abilities have been related to emotion attribution in the 
happy victimizer task: inhibitory control and counterfactual reasoning ability.  
Inhibitory control has been conceptualized as the conscious regulation or inhibition of 
a pleasurable and dominant but maladaptive response (Kochanska, Murray, & Coy, 1997; 
Rothbart, 1989), an ability that develops over the course of childhood and early adolescence. 
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As pointed out by Gummerum et al. (2010), the happy victimizer situation constitutes a 
prosocial moral dilemma (Eisenberg, 1986), in which a person’s (selfish) desires conflict with 
prosocial moral norms. Attributing morally appropriate (negative) emotions to the violator 
requires participants to give priority to moral norms over the violator’s personal desires. 
According to Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, & van den Ende (1996), by 5 years of age 
children take a subjective view of desire fulfillment, that is, children understand that a person 
will be pleased if s/he gets what s/he wants. Consequently, children adopting a subjective 
orientation towards desire would attribute positive emotions to a happy victimizer, if the 
transgression fulfills the victimizer’s personal desires. Based on this research, the attribution 
of positive emotions to a victimizer who fulfilled his/her personal desires would be the 
dominant but (morally) maladaptive response. Inhibitory control abilities might help children 
to overcome this dominant response and attribute negative emotions to the victimizer. 
Colasante, Zuffiano, Bae, and Malti (2014) measured 4- and 8-year-old children’s tendency 
to show inhibitory control abilities via caregiver-report and found that inhibitory control was 
significantly positively related to the attribution of negative emotion attributions in happy 
victimizer tasks.  
Counterfactual thinking has been defined as the capacity to compare reality to an 
imagined alternative (Roese, 1997), or the ability to “hold in mind two possibilities” (Beck, 
Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006, p. 414). Research has shown that only at around 7 years 
of age can children understand that a factual and a counterfactual event are two possibilities 
that could both have realistically occurred in the past (Beck et al., 2006). Based on studies 
with adults and children (e.g., Mandel & Dhami, 2005; Meehan & Byrne, 2005; Niedenthal, 
Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994), Gummerum, Cribbett, Nogueira Nicolau, and Uren (2013) 
argued that the attribution of negative emotions to the victimizer is related to the ability to 
spontaneously undo a negative factual situation (e.g., the classmate pushing the child off the 
Moral Emotion Attribution and Response Format      8 
 
 
swing) and to imagine alternative counterfactual scenarios that might have led to a better 
outcome (e.g., the classmate asking the child to take turns on the swing). The authors showed 
that 8-year-old children had higher counterfactual reasoning abilities than 4-year-olds, and 
that counterfactual reasoning positively predicted negative emotion attributions. Furthermore, 
giving children a counterfactual prompt that reminded them to think of alternatives to reality 
(the norm violation) increased negative emotion attribution in both age groups. 
The role of response format 
The research reviewed above indicates that young children’s difficulty with 
attributing moral (negative) emotions in the happy victimizer task might be partly due to their 
limited cognitive abilities, such inhibitory control or counterfactual reasoning.  If this is the 
case, then making the happy victimizer task less cognitively demanding might increase the 
attribution of negative emotions to a victimizer even in young children. Previous research has 
shown that changing the way children respond to a task helps them in overcoming (some of) 
its cognitive demands. This is particularly true for tasks that required children to inhibit an 
incorrect but salient or dominant response to arrive at a correct solution. For example, 
Carlson et al. (1998) presented 3-year-old children with a deception task. Correct responses 
in this task required participants to inhibit a salient and dominant response. In a standard 
condition, participants had to indicate their choices by pointing with their finger to a location. 
In an arrow condition, children pointed with a rotating arrow, a novel non-standard response 
mode. Compared to the standard condition, children in the arrow condition were significantly 
more likely to use deception and correctly attributed a false belief to their opponent in the 
deception task. Similarly, Hala and Russell (2001) found that 3-year-olds’correct deceptive 
choices in the Windows Task were significantly higher when children responded with a novel 
pointing device or indicated their choices with a marker (a non-standard response) than when 
they pointed with their finger (a standard response). Hala and Russell (2001) suggested that 
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non-standard response modes reduce the inhibitory demands of the deception tasks. Standard 
responses, such as pointing with a finger, are well-practiced and common in children and 
invite unreflective behaviour that is influenced by salience. Non-standard responses, on the 
other hand, are less likely to be practiced and spontaneous and are therefore more likely to 
lead to reflective and correct choices.  
Children’s inhibition of a prepotent or dominant response can also be improved by 
introducing a delay before a response. Diamond et al. (2002) tested 4-year-old children on the 
day-night task, in which participants have to keep two rules in mind and in which they have 
to inhibit the most salient dominant response. Introducing a ditty (i.e., the experimenter 
singing “Think about the answer. Don’t tell me.”) between the presentation of a stimulus and 
children’s responses significantly improved participants’ performance on the task compared 
to a standard condition. Thus, having to wait might allow children to overcome the dominant 
but incorrect response and compute the correct answer. Similarly, Beck et al. (2011) showed 
that both pointing with an arrow (a non-standard response) and asking children to wait before 
they made their choices, improved 3- to 5-year-olds’ performance on counterfactual 
reasoning tasks compared to a standard finger-pointing condition. Successful completion of 
counterfactual tasks required children to ignore their knowledge about the factual world. 
Carroll and colleagues (Carroll, FitzGibbon & Critchley, 2014; Carroll, Riggs, 
Apperly, Graham, & Geoghegan, 2012) investigated the response-mode effect for a number 
of executive function and theory of mind tasks to gauge the cognitive processes underlying 
preschool children’s improved performance with non-standard response modes. They found 
that alternative response modes (e.g., pointing with an arrow) led to more correct responses 
only on the Windows Task, a measure of executive function, but not on false belief or 
inhibitory control tasks (Carroll et al., 2012). Thus, the response-mode effect is task-specific, 
and different types of alternative responses might help performance in different types of 
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tasks. Whereas inhibitory control and counterfactual reasoning may be boosted by 
introducing a delay (Beck et al.,2011; Diamond et al., 2002), strategic reasoning in children 
might be enhanced by using non-standard response formats. Success on strategic reasoning 
tasks (e.g., the Windows Task and other deception tasks) typically requires children to devise 
and act on an appropriate strategy that runs counter to an incorrect but salient response. 
Carroll et al. (2014) suggested that non-standard response formats gives children the time to 
cognitively distance themselves from the task, inhibit the dominant but incorrect response, 
and arrive at a reflective, reasoned, and correct answer.  
The present research 
Given this research, we investigated whether different types of response formats 
would also affect children’s emotion attribution to a victimizer. As discussed above, there is 
correlational and experimental evidence that cognitive abilities, such as inhibitory control and 
counterfactual reasoning, play a role for children’s moral emotion attribution in the happy 
victimizer task (Colasante et al., 2014; Gummerum et al., 2013). Since children showed 
improved performance in inhibitory control and counterfactual reasoning tasks with 
alternative response formats, we expected that such alternative response formats would also 
increase the attribution of negative emotions to the victimizer. 
We studied the role of response format for both emotion attribution and moral 
motivation with respect to the victimizer and when children were asked to imagine 
themselves in the role of the victimizer (i.e., how would children feel if they were the 
victimizer). Previous research has shown that (young) children are more likely to attribute 
negative moral emotions and show higher moral motivation if they are asked to imagine 
themselves in the role of the victimizer (Keller et al., 2003; Malti & Keller, 2010). We 
investigated whether alternative response formats are particularly beneficial for emotion 
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attribution to the victimizer (instead of self-as victimizer), because ascribing appropriate 
moral emotions to the victimizer seems to be a more difficult task for younger children. 
Study 1 
Study 1 tested the response format effect for moral emotion attribution and moral 
motivation in a sample of 4- to 6-year-old British children. A majority of studies using 
alternative response formats investigated this effect in 3- to 5-year-old children, and we were 
interested whether changes in response format affected the moral emotion attribution and 
moral motivation of younger and older children to a similar degree. Gummerum et al. (2013) 
showed that both 4- and 8-year old children’s moral emotion attribution benefitted from a 
counterfactual prompt that reminded participants of potential alternative actions to the factual 
reality. Given these findings, we expected no age differences in the response format effect. 
 Study 1 asked participants to respond to the happy victimizer questions in one of three 
ways, in a normal condition, an arrow condition, and a wait condition. In the normal 
condition, which corresponds to methods used in previous happy victimizer research, 
participants had to answer by pointing with their finger. Waiting before giving an answer has 
been shown to improve children’s responses in both inhibitory-control tasks and 
counterfactual reasoning tasks (Beck et al., 2011; Diamond et al., 2002). In both types of 
tasks, as in the happy victimizer task, children have to devise a correct response (e.g., the 
victimizer violated a moral norm, therefore should feel bad) while being faced with a 
dominant but incorrect response option (e.g., the victimizer got what s/he wanted and 
therefore feels good). Thus, children need to inhibit a dominant, but incorrect response to 
arrive at the correct solution, and having to wait might help with this process. 
In the arrow condition, participants had to point with an arrow instead of their finger. 
Carroll et al. (2012) found that pointing with an arrow did not lead to more correct responses 
in an inhibitory control tasks, whereas Beck et al. (2011) showed that children’s responses to 
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a counterfactual reasoning task improved both in an arrow-pointing and wait condition 
compared to a normal, finger-pointing condition. Beck et al. (2011) argued that pointing with 
a finger is a well-practised response that is very hard for young children to refrain from. 
Because it is such an automatic way of responding for young children, it leads to quick and 
unreflective answers. Instead, pointing with an arrow is an unusual and new way of 
responding for children that does not allow for a quick response.  
Carroll et al. (2014) investigated the cognitive basis of alternative responses, such as 
pointing with an arrow, testing three different accounts. According to the delay account, 
alternative response-modes slow down children’s responses thus helping them to overcome 
the dominant, incorrect response. According the attentional support account, pointing with an 
arrow offers children an alternative focal point to fix their attention on, instead of focusing on 
the attentionally salient dominant response. Thus, an alternative way of responding helps 
children to refocus their attention away from the dominant response option. According to the 
cognitive distancing account, pointing with a finger is a natural, practised response for 
children, which leads to unreflective behaviour driven by salience. In contrast, pointing with 
an arrow is an unnatural (i.e., unpractised) response for children, is less likely to be 
associated with unreflective and more likely to lead to reflective responses. Based on their 
findings, Carroll et al. (2014) concluded that the response-mode effect likely arises from 
cognitive distancing – pointing with an arrow discourages spontaneous unreflective answers 
and encourages children to reflect on their responses. Note that his interpretation is in line 
with Beck et al.’s (2011) interpretation of response-mode effects in counterfactual reasoning 
tasks. 
Following this line of argument, comparing children’s moral emotion attribution in a 
wait and an arrow-pointing condition might allow identifying the cognitive basis of children’s 
moral emotion attribution in more detail. If children’s difficulty with attributing moral 
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emotions is due to impulsive, unreflective responding, then both waiting and pointing with an 
arrow should improve moral emotion attribution and moral motivation compared to a normal 
condition. If children’s difficulty with attributing moral emotions is a consequence of 
responding too quickly, then  we would expect an increase of moral emotion attribution and 
moral motivation only in the wait, but not the arrow pointing and normal conditions.  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-three 4- to 7-year-old children participated (MAge = 67.38 months, SD = 10.23 
months; range = 48 to 88 months; 42 girls). Children were recruited either from a participant 
register at the author’s institution or from primary schools in southern England. Ninety-eight 
percent of the sample was White-British, with the remaining participants either having an 
Eastern European or South Asian background. Most participants came from lower-middle to 
middle-class families.  
Procedure 
The study was approved by the university’s behavioural ethics committee, and all 
parents/guardians gave informed consent. Participants were tested individually, either in a 
separate room in their primary school or at the premises of the university’s BabyLab. All 
children were briefed about the study, and their right to withdraw and confidentiality was 
explained in age-appropriate language.  
Three happy victimizer tasks were presented to participants in counterbalanced order. 
Participants were tested in one of three conditions: (1) in the normal condition, participants 
were asked to use their finger to point to one face on an emotion scale; (2) in the arrow 
condition, participants were asked to use a paper arrow cut-out to point to an emotion face; 
(3) in the wait condition, participants were asked to throw a balloon into the air and wait for it 
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to touch the ground before using their finger to point to an emotion face. Once all tasks were 
completed, participants were debriefed. 
Materials  
 Happy Victimizer task. Children were presented with three short stories (taken from 
Keller et al., 2003), each with cartoon illustrations to assist the child. In the stealing story, the 
victimizer took another child’s chocolate while the other child was looking away; in the 
pushing story, the victimizer pushed another child off a swing; in the not-sharing story, the 
victimizer did not share colour pencils with another child. The gender of the story 
protagonists was matched to the gender of the participant. After each story children were 
asked a series of questions:  
1. Moral judgment: Was it right what (the victimizer) did? Why?  
2. Emotion attribution victimizer: How does (the victimizer) feel? Why?  
3. Emotion attribution self as victimizer: How would you feel, if you were (the 
victimizer)? Why? 
For the emotion attribution questions, participants were asked to pick one of 5 feeling faces 
ranging from very sad/bad (deep frown), sad/bad (frown), so-so (neutral face), happy/good 
(smile), to very happy/good (wide smile). Participants’ answers concerning the moral 
judgments questions as well as the reasons for their emotion attributions were noted verbatim 
by the experimenter. 
Coding 
Participants responses to the moral judgment questions (‘Is it right what the 
(victimizer) did?’) were coded numerically as either (1) for ‘yes’ it is right, (2) for ‘no’ it is 
not right or (3) for uncodable as the participant either did not know the answer or did not 
respond at all. Participants’ responses with regard to the emotion attribution questions were 
coded as (-2) very sad/bad, (-1) bad/sad, (0) so-so, (1) happy/good, and (2) very happy/good. 
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Responses to the open-ended justification questions (Why is it right/not right? Why 
does the victimizer feel like this? Why do you feel like this?) were coded according to four 
mutually exclusive categories: 
1. Outcome- oriented reasons when the victimizers’ actions or emotions were 
justified by referring to a desired outcome (e.g., “he wanted the chocolate”).  
2. External-sanctioned-oriented reasons involved possible disapproval or 
punishment by the victim or an authority (e.g., “he will be told off by his 
mum”).  
3. Morally oriented reasons referred to moral norms such as “It is not right to 
steal”, or negative (emotional) consequences for the victim (e.g., “the other 
would be sad”). 
4. Uncodable responses were uninterpretable with regards to the story (e.g., “it is 
sunny today and that is why”) or any “I don’t know” responses.  
Eighteen percent of the open-ended questions were coded by two independent raters. 
Inter-rater reliability was excellent with κ = .93. 
In line with previous research (e.g., Malti, Gummerum, Keller & Buchmann, 2009), 
we coded moral motivation scores which combined participants’ emotion attributions and 
justifications for emotion attributions to victimizers and self as victimizer in the three stories. 
A score of 0 indicates attribution of positive emotion to the victimizer or self as victimizer 
that is justified by outcome-oriented reasons or uncodable reasons. A score of 1 indicates the 
attribution of a neutral or negative emotion justified by external-sanction-oriented or 
uncodable reason. A score of 2 indicates the attribution of a neutral or negative emotion 
justified by a morally oriented reason.  
Results 
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Preliminary analyses indicted that age did not differ by condition, F(2, 62) = .04, p = 
.96. Concerning moral judgment, 5 (8%) participants in the pushing story, 6 (10%) 
participants in the stealing story, and 7 (12%) of participants in the not sharing story judged 
the violators’ actions as “right”. Moral judgment in the three stories did not correlate with 
age.1 
 Emotion attribution to the victimizer significantly correlated across stories (stealing- 
helping, r(92) = .39, p < .001; stealing – pushing, r(92) = .32, p = .002; helping-pushing, 
r(92) = .31, p = .003), as was emotion attribution to the self as victimizer (stealing - helping, 
r(92) = .47, p < .001; stealing – pushing, r(92) = .46, p < .001; helping - pushing, r(92) = .61, 
p < .001). We therefore created two new variables, Emotion Attribution to the Victimizer and 
Emotion Attribution to the Self as Victimizer, consisting of the mean emotion attribution to 
the victimizer or self as victimizer attributions across the three stories.  
 A repeated-measures ANCOVA with the within-subject variable victimizer (other as 
victimizer, self as victimizer), the between-subject variables condition (normal, wait, arrow), 
the covariate age (in months), and the dependent variable emotion attribution revealed the 
significant main effects of Condition, F(2, 89) = 9.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, and Age, F(1, 89) 
= 6.82, p = .01, ηp2=  .07 and the marginally significant effects of Victimizer, F(1, 89) = 3.49, 
p = .07, ηp2 = .04 and Victimizer x Age, F(1, 89) = 3.39, p = .07, ηp2 = .04. Post-hoc 
Bonferroni tests indicated that participants attributed significantly more negative emotions in 
the wait and arrow conditions than in the normal condition (all ps < .01). As shown in Figure 
1a, mean emotion attribution scores to victimizer or self were slightly positive (indicating that 
participants attributed so-so/happy/good emotions) in the normal condition, but they were 
negative in the wait and arrow conditions (indicating that participants attributed bad/sad 
emotions). With increasing age, participants attributed more negative emotions to self as 
victimizer, r(92) = -.26, p = .01, but not to the victimizer, r(92) = -.04, p = .74. Across ages 
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and conditions, participants tended to attribute slightly more negative emotions to other than 
to self as victimizer (Other as Victimizer: M = -.41, SD = .94; Self as victimizer: M = -.36, 
SD = 1.19). 
 Participants’ moral motivation scores significantly correlated across the three stories 
for victimizer (stealing – helping, ρ(33) = .42, p = .01; stealing – pushing, ρ(39) = .62, p < 
.001; helping – pushing, ρ(31) = .62, p < .001) and self as victimizer (stealing – helping, 
ρ(31) = .53, p = .002; stealing – pushing, ρ(44) = .46, p = .002; helping – pushing, ρ(34) = 
.65, p < .001). We created two new variables, Moral Motivation for Victimizer and Moral 
Motivation for Self as Victimizer, consisting of the respective mean moral motivation scores 
across the three stories. A repeated-measures ANCOVA with the within-subject variable 
victimizer (other as victimizer, self as victimizer), the between-subject variables condition 
(normal, wait, arrow), the covariate age (in months) and the dependent variable moral 
motivation revealed significant main effects of Condition, F(2, 67) = 3.94, p = .02, ηp2 = .10, 
and Age, F(1, 67) = 9.45, p = .002, ηp2= .12. Post-hoc Bonferroni tests indicated that 
participants showed significantly higher levels of moral motivation in the wait compared to 
the normal condition (p = .03) and marginally significantly higher levels of moral motivation 
in the arrow compared to the normal condition (p = .08). There was no significant difference 
in moral motivation between the wait and arrow condition (Figure 1b). Both Moral 
Motivation for Victimizer (r(79) = .28, p = .01) and Moral Motivation for Self as Victimizer 
(r(78) = .36, p = .001) increased with increasing age. 
Discussion 
 Overall, these results indicate that alternative response formats, such as having to wait 
before making an answer or pointing with an arrow instead of one’s finger, improved 4- to 6-
year-old children’s emotion attribution in the happy victimizer task. This points to the role of 
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cognitive abilities for children’s moral emotion attribution (see Colasante et al., 2014; 
Gummerum et al., 2013). 
As suggested by Diamond et al. (2002; Beck et al., 2011), having to wait before 
giving an answer might help children with overcoming the dominant response of attributing 
positive emotions to the victimizer (because s/he gets what s/he wanted), compute potential 
counterfactual alternatives to factual situation, and therefore attribute negative emotions to 
the violator. Similarly, whereas pointing with one’s finger is a well-practised, automatic 
response that is very hard for young children to refrain from and that leads to quick and 
unreflective answers, pointing with an arrow is an unusual way of responding that requires 
children to pause and gives them the opportunity to reflect about their answers (Beck et al., 
2011). Given that both waiting and pointing with an arrow lead to an increase in moral 
emotion attribution and, albeit marginally, moral motivation compared to the normal finger-
pointing condition, we suggest that both types of alternative response formats help children 
with overcoming impulsive, unreflective responses and lead to more reflective and correct 
answers (Carroll et al., 2012, 2014; Hala & Russell, 2001). 
Study 1 additionally revealed age effects known from previous research on the happy 
victimizer task (see Arsenio, 2014; Keller et al., 2003; Malti et al., 2009): Older children 
were more likely than younger ones to attribute moral emotions, particularly when attributing 
emotions to self-as-victimizer. 
Study 2 
 The aim of Study 2 was to replicate the response format effect in a different cultural 
context, namely in Spain. Most of the research on the happy victimizer task was conducted in 
North-American and Western-European countries. Only a handful of studies have 
investigated cross-cultural effects in moral emotion attribution (e.g., Keller et al., 2003; 
Krettenauer & Jia, 2013; Malti & Keller, 2010). Most pertinent to the current study, 
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Chaparro, Kim, Fernandez, and Malti (2013) compared moral emotion attribution in 6- and 9-
year-old children from Chile and Switzerland and found that 6-year-old Chilean children (like 
Spanish children defined as belonging to a collectivistic culture; see López-Pérez, 
Gummerum, Keller, Filippova, & Gordillo, 2015) attributed more (but not significantly so) 
moral emotion in the happy victimizer task than Swiss 6-year-olds. However, in both 
cultures, younger children tended to attribute positive emotions to the violator, whereas older 
children mostly attributed negative, moral emotions. Given these findings we were interested 
in (a) whether young Spanish children would show the happy victimizer effect in their 
emotion attributions to the violator; and (b) if yes, whether alternative response formats could 
ameliorate this effect, as we have found for British children in Study 1. In Study 2, we 
decided to compare the emotion attribution to the victimizer and moral motivation in a 
normal (finger-pointing) condition with a wait condition, because Study 1 found consistent 
response format effects for moral emotion attribution and moral motivation for the wait 
condition.  
Method 
Participants 
 Forty children aged 4 years-old (M= 57 months; SD= 3.46 months; 20 females) were 
recruited from a school in a medium-sized city in Spain. Testing was done individually. A 
range of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds were represented in the sample, but 
participants were predominantly white (95%) and from middle-class families. 
Procedure  
Parents’ informed consent was obtained prior to the administration of any task to the 
children. Participants were tested individually in quiet spaces within the school buildings. All 
children were briefed about the study and their right to withdraw and confidentiality was 
explained in age-appropriate language.  
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Three happy victimizer tasks were presented to participants in counterbalanced order. 
Participants were tested in one of two conditions: (1) in the normal condition, participants 
were asked to use their finger to point to one face on the emotion scale; (2) in the wait 
condition, participants were asked to throw a balloon into the air and wait for it to touch the 
ground before using their finger to point to an emotion face. Once all tasks were completed, 
participants were debriefed. 
Materials  
 Study 2 employed the same three happy victimizer stories and questions as Study 1.  
Coding 
The coding of participants’ responses to the moral judgment questions (‘Is it right 
what the (victimiser) did?’), emotion attribution questions (‘How does the victimizer feel?’; 
How would you feel if you were the victimizer?’), and their responses to the open-ended 
questions (Why is it right/not right? Why does the victimizer/why do you feel like this?) were 
equivalent to the codings used in Study 1. Concerning the open-ended questions, the 
interviews of nine randomly selected participants were coded by two independent raters. 
Inter-rater reliability was very good with κ = .97. Moral motivation scores were calculated in 
the same manner as in Study 1. 
Results 
Independent sample t-tests indicated that participants in the normal and wait 
conditions did not differ with regards to age, t(38) = .45, p = .65. Concerning moral 
judgment, no participant in the pushing story, 5 (12%) of participants in the stealing story, 
and 3 (8%) participants in the not sharing story judged that it was right what the violator did. 
Moral judgment in the three stories did not correlate significantly with age.1 
 A repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with the within-subject 
variables victimizer (other as victimizer, self as victimizer) and story (pushing, stealing, not 
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sharing) and the between-subject variables condition (normal, wait) and the dependent 
variable emotion attribution revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 38) = 17.85, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .32 and a significant interaction effect of Story x Condition, F(2, 38) = 3.16, p 
=.05, ηp2= .08. As shown in Table 1, whereas in both conditions the mean emotion attribution 
score was negative, participants in the wait condition attributed significantly more negative 
emotions than participants in the normal condition (dfs = 38, all ps < .001). In the wait 
condition, participants attributed significantly more negative emotions in the Pushing and 
Stealing stories than the Not-sharing story (Table 1). There was no significant difference in 
the attribution of moral emotions across stories in the normal condition. 
 Concerning participants’ moral motivation, a repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
within-subject variables victimizer (other as victimizer, self as victimizer) and story (pushing, 
stealing, not sharing) and the between-subject variables condition (normal, wait) revealed a 
marginally significant main effect of condition, F(1, 33) = 4.08, p = .07, ηp2 = .25. Across 
stories and types of victimizers, participants in the wait condition displayed marginally higher 
levels of moral motivation compared to participants in the normal condition (see Table 2). 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated and reinforced (some of) the findings of Study 1 in participants 
from a different culture. Having to wait before giving an answer increased the negative 
emotion attributed to victimizers and self-as-victimizers compared to a normal condition 
where children could respond immediately by pointing with a finger. Asking children to wait 
before responding particularly benefitted their moral emotion attributions to the violator in 
the Pushing and Stealing stories. Pushing (i.e., physically harming) and stealing constitute 
negative moral duties. Previous research indicated that children regard violations of negative 
moral duties as more severe than not following positive moral duties, such as not sharing (e.g. 
Malti, Gasser, & Buchmann, 2009). Thus, having to wait with one’s response might have 
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helped children to think about the victimizer’s transgression in more detail and attribute 
negative emotions according to the perceived severity of the violation. 
 It is worth mentioning that while children showed higher moral motivation in the 
wait compared to the normal condition, this response-format effect was only marginally 
significant. We believe that this can be best explained with a lack of power due to a relatively 
small sample size in Study 2. Importantly, many children (5 - 15%, depending on story, type 
of victimizer, and condition) did not give a reason when attributing a negative or neutral 
emotion to the victimizer, which, according to our coding system, would assign them a moral 
motivation score of 1. It is not uncommon that young children have difficulties with 
formulating a reason for their emotion attributions (see Krettenauer et al., 2008). We do 
believe that children’s emotion attribution to the victimizer represent a valid insight into their 
understanding of the validity of moral rules, even when they were unable to produce a reason 
for their emotion attribution. As pointed out by Haidt (2001; see also Hume, 1751/1957), 
people’s emotional reactions or “gut feelings” reflect their moral intuitions as to what they 
regard as morally right or wrong.   
Although Study 2 revealed a similar response-format effect as Study 1 (at least for 
moral emotion attributions), even in the normal condition children attributed, on average, 
negative emotions. This is surprising, as the majority of empirical research in North-
American and Western European countries found that 4-year-old children attribute positive 
emotions to the victimizer (e.g., Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). Thus, Spanish children, 
on average, do not show the happy victimizer effect in their emotion attributions. This 
suggests potential cross-cultural differences in children’s moral emotion attributions, which 
should be explored in further studies.  
General Discussion 
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Previous research indicated young children’s difficulty with attributing negative 
emotions to the violator of a moral norm in the happy victimizer task might at least be partly 
due to their limited cognitive abilities (e.g., Colasante et al., 2014; Gummerum et al., 2013; 
Krettenauer et al., 2008). While previous research has shown a positive correlation between 
4- and 8-year-old children’s negative emotion attribution in the happy victimizer task and 
caregiver-rated inhibitory control (Colasante et al., 2014), such correlational studies can only 
be suggestive of underlying causal relationships. Thus, we believe that the experimental 
approach with the direct manipulation of cognitive demands, as adopted in the current study, 
can add a more detailed understanding of how specific cognitive abilities affect moral 
emotion attribution. In the current studies, participants were invited to respond to the happy 
victimizer task in a standard format and in non-standard ways (by having to wait or pointing 
with an arrow). We found that these non-standard response formats increased the moral 
emotion attribution and moral motivation of both younger and older children from two 
different cultures.  
The effect of different response formats has traditionally been investigated with tasks 
measuring children’s cognitive abilities, such as deception (Carlson et al., 1998; Hala & 
Russel, 2001), executive functions and inhibition (Carroll et al., 2012, 2014; Diamond et al., 
2002), and counterfactual reasoning (Beck et al., 2011). While all of these studies report 
positive effects of different non-standard response formats for different types of tasks, Carroll 
et al. (2012, 2014; see also Beck et al., 2011) pointed out that non-standard response modes 
(such as pointing with an arrow) might encourage children to cognitively distance themselves 
from following a prepotent or dominant response impulsively and might give them the time 
to formulate reasoned responses. Thus, according to that perspective, asking children to wait 
(Studies 1, 2) or point with an arrow (Study 1) rather than a finger helped participants to 
overcome their dominant response of attributing positive emotions to the victimizer, gave 
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them room and time to draw on their reasoning abilities, and reflect on their responses before 
stating them. It could be argued that Gummerum et al.’s (2013) counterfactual prompt (i.e., 
presenting children alternative scenarios to factual reality) has a similar function of inviting 
more reasoned responses.  
This interpretation of the response format effect, namely that non-standard response 
formats allow children time to formulate more reasoned responses, could also help with 
integrating motivational and cognitive accounts of the happy victimizer phenomenon 
discussed above. Specifically, according to the motivational account (Nunner-Winler, 2007; 
Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988), young children’s dominant response would be to attribute 
positive emotions to the victimizer, because s/he managed to fulfil his/her (selfish) desires 
through the violation. Non-standard response formats could give children the time to devise a 
reasoned response that draws on their established understanding of moral norms and moral 
violations (see Turiel, 1983).  
If positive, immoral emotion attributions in the happy victimizer task are indeed at 
least partly due to people following their dominant or preponent response and not having time 
to formulate a reasoned, correct answer, then this hypothesis could be investigated in further 
experimental studies. Dual process theories of reasoning (see Evans, 2008, for a review) 
assume that people’s information processing can be grouped into two systems. System 1 
reasoning is usually characterized by heuristic, intuitive, and automatic responses, whereas 
System 2 reasoning is associated with deliberate, analytical responses that rely on the ability 
to think hypothetically and draw on higher-order cognitive capacities. Appropriately 
attributing negative moral emotions to a violator in the happy victimizer task might rely, at 
least in part, on System 2 reasoning abilities. Previous research with adults has shown that 
people’s recruitment of System 2 reasoning abilities can be experimentally manipulated. For 
example, metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency (e.g., presenting information 
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in a difficult-to-read font) increased adults’ reliance on System 2 processing styles (Alter, 
Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). On the other hand, asking people to respond under 
cognitive load, depressed adults’ performance and response times in Theory of Mind and 
executive function tasks (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant & Todd, 2011; Bull, Phillips & 
Conway, 2008). The effect of such manipulations of System 1/System 2 processing on moral 
emotion attribution and moral motivation might be tested in future studies.  
Previous research has mainly investigated the response format effect in children aged 
3 to 5 years old. Study 1 included a wider age range of 4- to 7-year-old children, mainly 
because the happy victimizer effect tends to decrease in these ages (Arsenio, 2014). Like 
numerous other studies, Study 1 showed the attributions of negative emotions to the 
victimizer and moral motivation increased with age. Similar to Gummerum et al. (2013) both 
younger and older children benefitted equally from a non-standard response format.  
We did not find that non-standard response formats affected the attribution of emotion 
to a hypothetical victimizer or to oneself as victimizer differently. This is surprising, as 
previous research (e.g., Keller et al., 2003) found that children are more likely to attribute 
negative moral emotions to themselves as victimizer than to a hypothetical victimizer. It has 
been proposed (Gummerum et al., 2013; Sokol, 2004) that inviting children to imagine 
themselves as the victimizer (“how would you feel, if you were the victimizer?”) encourages 
them to construct alternatives to reality, that is, to engage in counterfactual reasoning. As 
argued above, the non-standard response formats employed in the current studies gave 
participants time to reflect on their responses to the emotion attribution questions. Our 
findings indicate that this “reflection time” benefitted both emotion attribution and moral 
motivation to victimizer and self-as-victimizer. 
Even though differences in methodologies precluded us to make direct comparisons 
between the British (Study 1) and Spanish (Study 2) samples, the differences in moral 
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emotion attributions between the two samples, particularly in the normal response format, 
warrant a comment. The normal response condition was modelled on the methods typically 
used in happy victimizer research (see Arsenio, 2014; Krettenauer et al., 2008). Similar to 
findings reported in previous research, in the normal response condition British participants 
attributed, on average, neutral or slightly positive emotions to the victimizer, and negative 
moral emotion attribution increased with age. However, Spanish children, on average, 
reported that the victimizer or self-as-victimizer would feel bad, even in the normal response 
condition. This is particularly noteworthy, as the Spanish participants were 4-year-olds, an 
age where the majority of children have been reported to attribute positive emotions to a 
victimizer. It might be that children from collectivistic cultures, because of their culture’s 
stronger emphasis on paying attention to the needs of (close) others, tend to focus more on 
the victim, which, in turn, affects their moral emotion attribution. Future research should 
investigate cultural differences in moral emotion attribution and moral motivation in more 
detail. In general, while a host of studies have assessed the role of individual differences in 
social-cognitive, social-emotional, and cognitive abilities for the development of moral 
emotions (see Krettenauer et al., 2008; Malti & Ongley, 2014), how meso- and macro-level 
factors, such as relationships with peers and parents (Malti & Buchmann, 2010; Malti, 
Eisenberg, Kim & Buchmann, 2013) or culture (Chaparro et al., 2013; Keller et al., 2003; 
Krettenauer & Jia, 2013) affect the development of moral emotion attribution in the happy 
victimizer task is a comparatively understudied topic.  
Investigating the cognitive, motivational, and social factors underlying moral emotion 
attribution does not just have implications for theories of moral functioning and behaviour, 
but also practical implications. A number of studies (see Malti & Krettenauer, 2013, for a 
meta-analysis) suggested that attributing negative emotions to a victimizer play an important 
role in children’s morally relevant behaviour. Specifically, Malti and Krettenauer’s (2013) 
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meta-analysis revealed small-size relationships between emotion attributions and prosocial 
behaviours (e.g., sharing) and moderate-size relationships between emotion attributions and 
antisocial behaviours (e.g., physical harm, aggression). Consequently, supporting children’s 
moral emotion attributions might contribute their morally relevant behaviours in real-life 
situations. Our studies suggest that in addition to encouraging children’s internalization of 
moral norms (as proposed by a motivational account of moral emotion attribution), assisting 
the development cognitive abilities (e.g., though encouraging and giving time for reflection 
on moral norms; training inhibitory control abilities) might be another fruitful avenue to 
advance mature moral emotion attributions and moral behaviour.   
In sum, the results from this research showed that alternative response formats help 
children’s moral emotion attribution in the happy victimizer paradigm. This adds to the 
growing understanding of the role of cognitive factors in children’s moral emotion 
attribution. Given the importance of correctly anticipating actors’ emotions for the 
internalization of moral norms and moral behaviour (Keller, 2004; Malti & Krettenauer, 
2013), future research should continue to assess how cognitive, social-cognitive, and social 
variables contribute to the development of children’s moral emotions and moral functioning.  
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Footnotes 
1 The following analyses were conducted on the full sample, which included both 
participants who, in their moral judgment, stated that what the violator did was “right” and 
participants, who stated that what the violator did was “not right”. We additionally conducted 
analyses on a reduced sample, which only included those participants who, in their moral 
judgment, stated that what the violator did was “not right”. For Study 1, analyses with the 
reduced sample revealed significant main effects of condition and age. Participants attributed 
more moral emotions in the wait and arrow condition than in the normal condition, and 
showed higher moral motivation in the wait than in the normal condition. With increasing 
age, participants attributed more moral emotions and showed higher moral motivation. For 
Study 2, analyses on the reduced sample revealed a significant main effect of condition, with 
participants in the wait condition attributing significantly more moral emotion (showing 
higher moral motivation) than participants in the normal condition. More details concerning 
the analyses and results of the reduced sample are available from the first author upon 
request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
